Reflecting Alan Robinson's fundamental contribution to computational logic, this book brings together seminal papers in inference, equality theories, and logic programming. It is an exceptional collection that ranges from surveys of major areas to new results in more specialized topics. Alan Robinson is currently the University Professor at Syracuse University. Jean-Louis Lassez is a Research Scientist at the IBM Thomas J. Watson Research Center. Gordon Plotkin is Professor of Computer Science at the University of Edinburgh. Contents: Inference. Subsumption, A Sometimes (...) Undervalued Procedure, Larry Wos, Ross Overbeek, and Ewing Lusk. The Markgraf Karl Refutation Procedure, Hans Jurgen Ohlbach and Jorg H. Siekmann. Modal Logic Should Say More than it Does, Melvin Fitting. Interactive Proof Presentation, W. W. Bledsoe. Intelligent Backtracking Revisited, Maurice Bruynooghe. A Science of Reasoning, Alan Bundy. Inductive Inference of Theories from Facts, Ehud Y. Shapiro. Equality. Solving Equations in Abstract Algebras: A Rule-based Survey of Unification, Jean-Pierre Jouannaud and Claude Kirchner. Disunification: A Survey, Hubert Comon. A Case Study of the Completion Procedure: Proving Ring Commutativity Problems, Deepak Kapur and Hantao Zhang. Computations in Regular Rewriting Systems I and II, Girard Huet and JeanJacques Levy. Unification and ML Type Reconstruction, Paris Kanellakis, Harry Mairson, and John Mitchell. Automatic Dimensional Analysis, Mitchell Wand. Logic Programming. Logic Programming Schemes and Their Implementations, Keith Clark. A Near-Horn Prolog for Compilation, Donald Loveland and David Reed. Unfold/Fold Transformations of Logic Programs, P. A. Gardner and J. C. Shepherdson. An Algebraic Representation of Logic Program Computations, Andrea Corradini and Ugo Montanari. Theory of Disjunctive Logic Programs, Jack Minker, Arcot Rajasekar, and Jorge Lobo. Bottom-Up Evaluation of Logic Programs, Jeffrey Naughton and Raghu Ramakrishnan. Absys, the First Logic Programming Language: A View of the Inevitability of Logic Programming, E. W. Elcock. (shrink)

BackgroundIn the Canadian Alliance for Healthy Hearts and Minds (CAHHM) cohort, participants underwent magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) of the brain, heart, and abdomen, that generated incidental findings (IFs). The approach to managing these unexpected results remain a complex issue. Our objectives were to describe the CAHHM policy for the management of IFs, to understand the impact of disclosing IFs to healthy research participants, and to reflect on the ethical obligations of researchers in future MRI studies.MethodsBetween 2013 and 2019, 8252 participants (...) (mean age 58 ± 9 years, 54% women) were recruited with a follow-up questionnaire administered to 909 participants (40% response rate) at 1-year. The CAHHM policy followed a restricted approach, whereby routine feedback on IFs was not provided. Only IFs of severe structural abnormalities were reported.ResultsSevere structural abnormalities occurred in 8.3% (95% confidence interval 7.7–8.9%) of participants, with the highest proportions found in the brain (4.2%) and abdomen (3.1%). The majority of participants (97%) informed of an IF reported no change in quality of life, with 3% of participants reporting that the knowledge of an IF negatively impacted their quality of life. Furthermore, 50% reported increased stress in learning about an IF, and in 95%, the discovery of an IF did not adversely impact his/her life insurance policy. Most participants (90%) would enrol in the study again and perceived the MRI scan to be beneficial, regardless of whether they were informed of IFs. While the implications of a restricted approach to IF management was perceived to be mostly positive, a degree of diagnostic misconception was present amongst participants, indicating the importance of a more thorough consent process to support participant autonomy.ConclusionThe management of IFs from research MRI scans remain a challenging issue, as participants may experience stress and a reduced quality of life when IFs are disclosed. The restricted approach to IF management in CAHHM demonstrated a fair fulfillment of the overarching ethical principles of respect for autonomy, concern for wellbeing, and justice. The approach outlined in the CAHHM policy may serve as a framework for future research studies.Clinical trial registrationhttps://clinicaltrials.gov/ct2/show/nct02220582. (shrink)

Exceptionally preserved fossils are the product of complex interplays of biological and geological processes including burial, autolysis and microbial decay, authigenic mineralization, diagenesis, metamorphism, and finally weathering and exhumation. Determining which tissues are preserved and how biases affect their preservation pathways is important for interpreting fossils in phylogenetic, ecological, and evolutionary frameworks. Although laboratory decay experiments reveal important aspects of fossilization, applying the results directly to the interpretation of exceptionally preserved fossils may overlook the impact of other key processes that (...) remove or preserve morphological information. Investigations of fossils preserving non-biomineralized tissues suggest that certain structures that are decay resistant are rarely preserved, and decay-prone structures can fossilize, albeit rarely. As we review here, decay resistance is an imperfect indicator of fossilization potential, and a suite of biological and geological processes account for the features preserved in exceptional fossils. Organisms decayed experimentally in seawater have been used as direct analogs for soft-bodied fossil taxa, with fossils representing a snapshot of a particular stage of decay. We argue that numerous geological and biological processes account for fossilization and that all of these should be considered when reconstructing extinct organisms. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 537 tion of his three dialogues, and of course there are several references to Hume's intern= parable Dialogues. The bibliographic essay is useful with respect to general works and period pieces but unfortunately does little to help those who are seeking further help in understanding an individual writer. Professor France's work is an invaluable guide nevertheless for those who realize that authors, even philosophers, do not write (...) in a cultural vacuum. NICHOLASCAPALDI Queens College, CUNY Die Auseinandersetzung yon ldealismus und Realismus in Fichtes Wissenscha/tslehre. By Ingeborg Schfissler. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972. Pp. 182. DM 24.50) For Fichte scholars this closely argued and well organized study of the foundations of Fichte's Wissenscha/tslehre is simply a must. American philosophers generally, however, will not become Fichte enthusiasts after reading this book. But this is not the fault of the authoress, but of Fichte. The key question which Dr. SchiJssler raises is, What role does realism play in Fichte's transcendental idealism? With this question in mind she examines Fichte's "foundation of the entire theory of science" of 1794-1795 and related matters, and the "theory of science" of 1804, together with the lecture of 1813. As Fichte originally saw the task of philosophy it was to explain theoretical, i.e., scientific, consciousness in terms of its own foundation. In 1804, however, the task was conceived as presentation of absolute truth; and in 1813, Fichte tried to understand the theory of science as a theory of appearances. Dr. Schfissler's thesis is that all three approaches are necessary; that, in fact, the changes in Fichte's conception of what a theory of science is or ought to be are grounded in the nature of transcendental philosophy itself. The book is not something one reads for relaxation; its sustained and detailed arguments militate against that. But it is a highly illuminating study, and well worth the effort of careful analysis. W. H. WE~mSTBR Florida State University The Manifold in Perception. Theories of Art.from Kant to Hildebrand. By Michael Pedro. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. Oxford-Warburg Studies) This is a survey of theories of art of Kant, Schiller, Herbart, Hildebrand, Schopenhauer and Fiedler. One may question the value of a re-statement of this sort, over simply another reading of the works of the authors themselves. Pedro's answer may be found in the Preface and again in a more extended statement in the conclusion. "German aesthetic theory from Kant through to the end of the nineteenth century seemed to contain valuable critical ideas quite absent from contemporary philosophical writing." Pedro's attempt has been to "re-locate notions in current use, like 'aesthetic detachment', within the sustained systematic discourse of which they were once part. This seemed a way both of uncovering a number of assumptions which have been constraining writing on art for some time, and of clarifying a number of crucial insights of earlier theorists." The author's account is almost entirely expository, its negative critical questions being limited almost exclusively to Herbart. Yet even here, when the author indicates that Herbart's theory of mind "exhibits certain very basic logical difficulties," he adds that 538 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY "they are difficulties which have a particular importance in the discussion of art.... " Podro's clarification is largely made through the asking of questions which the authors themselves did not ask and then suggesting answers to these questions in the light of what the authors did say. The two chapters on Schiller form the core of the book. Schiller's theory of art and aesthetic education of man is placed as central to Podro's account of an aesthetic tradition beginning with Kant and ending with Fiedler. The "tradition" detailed in Podro's book is described as having two underlying assumptions. The first was that any account of art must indicate distinctive or at least characteristic uses of our perception, uses which if not exclusive to art are at least necessary to it, and which are seen in art in a particularly striking way. The second assumption was that art involves our attitudes, in the sense of our serious purposes as... (shrink)

G.E. Moore’s open question arguments (OQAs) have been targeted by unsympathetic philosophers for close to a century. Perhaps the most serious criticism directed towards Moore’s OQAs is that they beg the question against targeted theories. After presenting an OQA extracted from §13 of Principia Ethica, I lodge this question-begging objection before articulating Moore’s autobiographical efforts to mitigate its force. I then suggest that Moore’s OQAs are incomplete, awaiting the final stage of construction, an explanation of the ‘open question’ phenomenon—the inclination (...) of many philosophers to endorse the central premises of Moore’s OQAs. After a brief investigation of noncognitivist attempts to explain the phenomenon, I propose a semantic explanation, a cognitivist explanation that commits its proponents neither to mysterious nonnatural properties nor to perilous positions regarding the paradox of analysis. I conclude by arguing that Moore’s completed OQAs are successful, but his deployment of them in efforts to refute metaethical naturalism, even analytic or semantic versions, is not. (shrink)

Subjects and Simulations presents essays focused on suffering and sublimity, representation and subjectivity, and the relation of truth and appearance through engagement with the legacies of Jean Baudrillard and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe.

Dès l'origine, l'idée d'Ecole est liée à celle de savoir. Une même avancée a créé les savoirs théoriques distincts des techniques et les disciplines scolaires, qui ont pour fin une éducation désintéressée. Et le principe fondamental de l'Ecole est resté que les savoirs ne sont pas seulement les résultats de la formation mais qu'ils sont par eux-mêmes formateurs. Encore faut-il que les contenus et les modalités de l'enseignement ne compromettent pas cette fonction proprement scolaire. Or l'Ecole d'aujourd'hui se déscolarise sous (...) la pression de la logique libérale, de l'attente sociale, du modèle de l'entreprise, du pédagogisme, des contre-cultures et de toutes les formes modernes d'irrespect pour l'étude. B. Barthelmé, Ch. Coutel, G. Guillot, B. Jolibert et B. Vandewalle examinent ici sous des angles différents, dans cinq contributions complémentaires et empreintes d'une même vigilance philosophique pour l'Ecole, cette problématique qui est celle de l'avenir de l'éducation. (shrink)

Along with Husserl's Ideas and Heidegger's Being and Time, Being Given is one of the classic works of phenomenology in the twentieth century. Through readings of Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Derrida, and twentieth-century French phenomenology (e.g., Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, and Henry), it ventures a bold and decisive reappraisal of phenomenology and its possibilities. Its author's most original work to date, the book pushes phenomenology to its limits in an attempt to redefine and recover the phenomenological ideal, which the author argues has never (...) been realized in any of the historical phenomenologies. Against Husserl's reduction to consciousness and Heidegger's reduction to Dasein, the author proposes a third reduction to givenness, wherein phenomena appear unconditionally and show themselves from themselves at their own initiative. Being Given is the clearest, most systematic response to questions that have occupied its author for the better part of two decades. The book articulates a powerful set of concepts that should provoke new research in philosophy, religion, and art, as well as at the intersection of these disciplines. Some of the significant issues it treats include the phenomenological definition of the phenomenon, the redefinition of the gift in terms not of economy but of givenness, the nature of saturated phenomena, and the question “Who comes after the subject?” Throughout his consideration of these issues, the author carefully notes their significance for the increasingly popular fields of religious studies and philosophy of religion. Being Given is therefore indispensable reading for anyone interested in the question of the relation between the phenomenological and the theological in Marion and emergent French phenomenology. (shrink)

In the Canadian forensic psychiatric context, the concepts of risk and dangerousness interact, intersect, and morph into the notion of significant threat to the safety of the public. Stemming from the results of a critical ethnography of the Ontario Review Board, this article unpacks the central role of forensic psychiatric nursing, as an example of a 'psych' discipline (e.g., psychiatry and psychology), in a system that is built to produce risky persons and to legitimize their detention and supervision. By using (...) excerpt of interviews conducted with nurses, ethnographic observations of Review Board hearings, and other documentary artifacts, the findings illustrate how rationalizations of risk and dangerousness are contingent on space, time, and observer. Depending on the time of the assessment or on the health‐care professional who performs it, different elements including, but not limited to, mental illness, interpersonal relationships, financial instability, and sexual vulnerability, are relied upon in very fluid, interchangeable, and discretionary ways to justify findings of dangerousness. Such a dynamic expands the reach of psychiatry's legitimacy at identifying risky conduct and controlling risky persons to domains very loosely associated with the notion of dangerousness. The work of Foucault and Castel provides the theoretical backdrop on which rests the discussion and the implications for nursing. (shrink)

We present a single sequent calculus common to classical, intuitionistic and linear logics. The main novelty is that classical, intuitionistic and linear logics appear as fragments, i.e. as particular classes of formulas and sequents. For instance, a proof of an intuitionistic formula A may use classical or linear lemmas without any restriction: but after cut-elimination the proof of A is wholly intuitionistic, what is superficially achieved by the subformula property and more deeply by a very careful treatment of structural rules. (...) This approach is radically different from the one that consists in “changing the rule of the game” when we want to change logic, e.g. pass from one style of sequent to another: here, there is only one logic, which—depending on its use—may appear classical, intuitionistic or linear. (shrink)

§13 of Principia Ethica contains G. E. Moore’s most famous open question arguments. Several of Moore’s contemporaries defended various forms of metaethical nonnaturalism—a doctrine Moore himself endorsed—by appeal to OQAs. Some contemporary cognitivists embrace the force of Moore’s OQAs against metaethical naturalism. And those who posit noncognitivist meaning components of ethical terms have traditionally used OQAs to fuel their own emotivist, prescriptivist, and expressivist metaethical programs. Despite this influence, Moore’s OQAs have been ridiculed in recent decades. Their deployment has been (...) labeled “accident prone,” “simple to dismiss,” and just plain invalid. Critics accuse Moore of begging the question. Others argue that his OQAs founder upon the paradox of analysis. And still others argue that Moore’s open question argumentation is incompatible with the Kripke–Putnam causal theory of reference and thus it “simply fails; it is bankrupt”. I aim to show that there is something of continuing value in Moore’s open question efforts. I present and criticize Nicholas Sturgeon’s influential interpretation of Moore’s OQAs as a means to motivate and explicate my own interpretation of Moore’s thoughts in §13 of Principia Ethica. I then articulate the role that OQAs are intended to play in Moore’s overall argumentative strategies to undermine metaethical naturalism and thereby provide some theoretical support for metaethical nonnaturalism. Finally, I attend to the most prominent objections to Moore’s theorizing and attempt to evaluate the extent to which Moore’s efforts are successful. My hope is to display both the promising portions of Moore’s metaethical argumentation in Principia Ethica as well as its limitations. (shrink)

Présentation de la spécificité de l'épistémologie en France, entre philosophie de la connaissance et philosophie des sciences, à travers un panorama de son histoire depuis la fin du XIXe siècle, de ses grands courants et de ses grandes figures : A. Comte, A. Cournot, C. Bernard, G. Bachelard, H. Poincaré, etc.

O par Fortuna-Virtù é discutido nas diversas análises críticas do pensamento de Machiavelli e, embora tais termos possuam origens e tradições bem determinadas ao longo do pensamento latino, principalmente específicas considerações antigas e medievais em algumas recepções durante o humanismo cívico, suas características elusivas ao longo das argumentações de Machiavelli são mantidas, possibilitando inúmeros debates acadêmicos. Diante da ambivalência e da ambiguidade da ideia de Virtù perante relevantes e variadas tradições, contínuas buscas por clarificação são feitas ao longo do corpus (...) do secretário florentino, associando o termo a outras importantes e centrais reflexões, e.g., desiderio, stato, forza. A instabilidade política, as forças além do controle humano, a imponderabilidade das ações civis são temas recorrentes nas concepções sobre a Fortuna em variadas argumentações desse autor. Em aberto diálogo com os humanistas cívicos que enfatizam maior participação política e social, mesclando embasamento racional, consideração moral e as discussões sobre as formas dos regimes políticos, esse escritor apresenta uma concepção historiográfica, a revigorar tradições do mundo antigo, na criação de uma ordem civil mediante a Virtù, a qual demanda comprometimento pessoal e público na exaltação das potencialidades e dos limites humanos. Reinserir a relevância da paridade entre Fortuna e Virtù em Machiavelli é um passo relevante no combate a leituras anacrônicas. Assim, analisar-se-ão os exemplos mais significativos dos fundadores e dos sustentadores da ordem civil destacados nos textos discursivos do florentino, e.g., Romulo, Numa, Moisés, Cesare Bórgia, Castruccio Castracani. Ao estudar as imagens da Fortuna, em face das concepções políticas e antropológicas do autor, discutir-se-á a centralidade da díade Virtù-Fortuna no desenvolvimento argumentativo de algumas ideias principais desse famoso pensador político. (shrink)

Suppose that α = γ + δ where $\gamma \geq \delta > 0$ . Then there is a graph G = (ω ω α ,E) which has no independent set of order type ω ω α and has no pentagram (a pentagram is a set of five points with all pairs joined by edges). In the notation of Erdos and Rado, who generalized Ramsey's Theorem to this setting, $\omega^{\omega^\alpha} \nrightarrow (\omega^{\omega^\alpha},5)^2.$.

L'Existence de choses telles que des propositions, conc,ues comme distinctes des phrases qui les expriment et dont elles constituent comme le sens — cela que l'on comprend en entendant une phrase — a été mise en question, par Quine, en particulier, et aussi défendue. Ce débat fera l'objet de ce texte.La proposition, comme on l’entendra ici, se définit essentiellement comme une synthèse de concepts. Cette définition en a été donnée par G.E. Moore, un peu avant que Russell ne la reprenne (...) dans trois grands articles publiés dans Mind en 1904, sous le titre de « Meinong’s Theory of Complexes and Assumptions ». (shrink)

As models of living beings acting in a real world biorobots undergo an accelerated “philogenic” complexification. The first efficient robots performed simple animal behaviours (e.g., those of ants, crickets) and later on isolated elementary behaviours of complex beings. The increasing complexity of the tasks robots are dedicated to is matched by an increasing complexity and versatility of the architectures now supporting conditioning or even elementary planning.

Observações sobre divergência entre G. Moyal (1988) e V. Carraud (1991) sobre as relações entre a prova a priori apresentada na Quinta Meditação de Descartes e a hipótese de uma possível objeção levantada por ateus.

Common-sense philosophers typically maintain that common-sense propositions have a certain kind of epistemic privilege that allows them to evade the threats of skepticism or radical revisionism. Butwhydo they have this special privilege? In response to this question, the “Common-Sense Tradition” contains many different strands of arguments. In this paper, I will develop a strategy that combines two of these strands of arguments. First, the “Dynamic Argument” (or the “starting-point argument”), inspired by Thomas Reid and Charles S. Peirce (but which will (...) be strengthened with the help of Gilbert Harman’s epistemology of belief revision). Second, G.E. Moore’s “greater certainty argument” (interpreted along the lines of Soames’ and Pollock’s construal). This combined strategy, I will argue, is the strong core of Common-Sense Philosophy, and relies on extremely modest and widely held assumptions. (shrink)

The suppression of the Modus Ponens inference is described as a loss of confidence in the conclusion C of an argument ''If A1 then C; If A2 then C; A1'' where A2 is a requirement for C to happen. It is hypothesised that this loss of confidence is due to the derivation of the conversational implicature ''there is a chance that A2 might not be satisfied'', and that different syntactic introductions of the requirement A2 (e.g., ''If C then A2'') will (...) lead to various frequencies in the derivation of this implicature, according to previous studies in the field of causal explanation. An experiment is conducted, whose results support those claims. Results are discussed in the light of the Mental Logic and Mental Model theories, as well as in the light of the pragmatic approach to uncertain reasoning. (shrink)

According to a well-known view in the philosophy of mind, intentional attitudes by their very nature satisfy requirements of rationality (e.g. Davidson 1980; Dennett 1987; Millar 2004). This view (which I shall call Constitutivism) features prominently as the ‘principle of minimal rationality’ in de Sousa’s monograph The Rationality of Emotion (1987). By explicating this principle in terms of the notion of the formal object of an attitude, de Sousa articulates an interesting and original version of Constitutivism, which differs in important (...) respects from other extant versions. In this paper, I explore this version of Constitutivism against the background of recent developments in the theory of rationality and make explicit its ramifications for the long-standing dispute over whether the mind is essentially normative. My focus will be on how to conceive of the form of the rationality requirements that attitudes as such must satisfy according to this principle. I argue that, although de Sousa seems officially to endorse a structuralist conception of rationality, according to which these requirements are requirements of coherence, his considerations on formal objects suggest that they are more aptly conceived in terms of a reasons-responsive conception of rationality. I further argue that which of these two readings we choose makes a significant difference to the prospect of vindicating the essential normativity of mind by invoking the principle of minimal rationality. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:104 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY thus cast into the depths of skepticism. Because of his acquaintance with the skeptical literature Chilling-worth rejected the first alternative. Arguments concerning the fallibility of the senses and reason and the complexity of reality itself were too strong to be ignored. However, he was also unwilling to accept the second alternative. He developed instead a middle position. In his Religion of Protestants (London, 16S8) he (...) develops a position based on an appeal to common-sense and a doctrine of levels os evidence and certainty. Theological problems are to be solved in the same manner as problems of ordinary men in ordinary situations. Any claim to revelation, for example, is to be evaluated as any other problem, by examining the adequacy of the testimony and the reliability of witnesses. Hence the sense of mystery, of the revealedness of revelation is lost. Depending on whether one has good or poor evidence for a proposition one can be more or le~ certain of it. In most cases, one's certainty of religious propositions is of the same sort as that of the carpenter or pilot in their respective trades-not absolute certainty but certainty enough to assure good practical results. Hence religious belief is adequate if it serves to turn one from vice to virtue. Since religious truth is no longer unique, either with respect to evidence or certainty, it is available to all who are honest in their pursuit of it. Thus the epistemological justification for the democratization of religion of which Lichtenstein makes so much is provided a generation before More published his major works. My criticism of the book, then, is not that Lichtenstein attributes the de-emphasis of reason, loss of mystery, etc., of eighteenth-century thought solely to, More (though since he writes primarily on only one man one sometimes gets that impression) but that his account of the milieu from which More springs and of which he is only a part is inadequate. But for all that the book is well worth reading. HENRY G. VAN LEEUWs Hanover College Pascal. By Jean Steinmann. New edition revised and enlarged. ([Brus~ls]: Desclge De Brouwer [1962]. Pp. 378, illus. Bfr. 240.) Sorte de testament spirituel du critique tragiquement et prgmaturgment disparu, la seconde 6~dition du Pascal de Steinmann constitue sans doute la synth~se la plus agrgable et commode qui existe actuellement de la vie, de roeuvre et de la rgputation de Pascal. Entre les nombreux auteurs qui ont successivement attirg la plume rive et fgconde de Steinmann, Pascal est, en effet un de ceux avec qui il avait le plus de familiaritg. Ecrivain, th~logien, mais surtout exegete, Steinmann a d'ailleurs su mieux que presque tous ses pr~d~cesseurs, caractgriser la sensibilitg biblique de Pascal et en souligner l'importance. Inversement, il marque le caract~re peu philosophique de l'Apologi'e et voit (~t notre sens avec raison) la principale originalitg de son auteur dans le fair qu'il a cherch~ ~ mener au christianisme par la psychologie et par l'histoire, non par la metaphysique. Le chapitre le plus neuf de Steinmann est enfin celui que traite de l'histoire posthume de Pascal, sorte de bibliographie comrfientge qui sera certainment fort utile ~t celui qui abordera l'immense litt~rature publige ~ son sujet. Une rgaction en pattie l~gitime contre le clichg romantique de l'"inquigtude pascalienne " entra~ne Steinmann ~t trop insister apr~s B~guin, sur un,dogmatisme" (p. 308) d'ailleurs rattach6 ~ l'h6r6dit~ paternelle dont nous doutons qu'elle aft 6t6 dominante dans ]e cas de Pascal. On regrette aussi l'ignorance de l'article d'Et. Gilson sur "ab~tir" BOOK REVIEWS t05 (p. 254), des insuflisances au sujet du p~ht~ originel (p. 253), l'aflirmation erron~e du caract~re spontan~ de la confession au P. Beurrier (p. 207 n.) et surtout le lapsus Pinthard pour Pinthereau (pp. 363, $78). A c6t~ du petit Pascal de Jean Mesnard, cla~ique dans les universitY, le present ouvrage n'en contribuera pas moins ~ r~pondre dans un tr~s large cercle une connaissance de l'auteur des Pens~es enrichie par la sympathie. JZAN... (shrink)

Making arguments makes reasons apparent. Sometimes those reasons may affect audiences’ relationships to claims (e.g., accept, adhere). But an over-emphasis on audience effects encouraged by functionalist theories of argumentation distracts attention from other things that making arguments can accomplish. We advance the normative pragmatic program on argumentation through two case studies of how early advocates for women’s suffrage in the U.S. made reasons apparent in order to show that what they were doing wasn’t ridiculous. While it might be possible to (...) identify this as a new function of argumentation, we encourage instead attention to a more important question: explaining how all the diverse uses of argument have pragmatic force. (shrink)

There is a wide range of things we do out of emotion. For example, we smile with pleasure, our voices drop when we are sad, we recoil in shock or jump for joy, we apologize to others out of remorse. It is uncontroversial that some of these behaviors are actions. Clearly, apologizing is an action if anything is. Things seem less clear in the case of other emotional behaviors. Intuitively, the drop in a sad person’s voice is something that happens (...) to her, rather than something she actively performs. Perhaps more interestingly, even jumping for joy can seem a problematic case: although its execution involves the active performance of certain movements, it has been argued to contrast, e.g., with an act of apology, in that it is not performed in order to achieve some end, such as repairing a relationship. This can make this behavior seem considerably different from paradigm actions. Our central concern in this paper is with which emotional behaviors should be classed as actions and why... (shrink)

This paper is a semantic analysis of ‘experienced action’ constructions in Umpithamu, a Paman language from Cape York Peninsula (Australia). The basic argument is that these constructions are related to the better-attested category of experiencer object constructions (e.g. Evans, Non-nominative subjects 1: 69–192, 2004), which in Umpithamu describe involuntary experience of bodily processes. Experienced action constructions extend the feature of ‘involuntary experience’ from processes within the body to actions originating outside the body, and thus provide a semantically marked alternative for (...) standard transitive clauses. The constructions are typologically interesting because they show the need to identify different loci of experiential semantics in a construction, and they help to clarify the status of control for human Undergoers within semantic typologies of reduced transitivity. (shrink)

Approximations form an essential part of scientific activity and they come in different forms: conceptual approximations (simplifications in models), mathematical approximations of various types (e.g. linear equations instead of non-linear ones, computational approximations), experimental approximations due to limitations of the instruments and so on and so forth. In this paper, we will consider one type of approximation, namely numerical approximations involved in the comparison of two results, be they experimental or theoretical. Our goal is to lay down the conceptual and (...) formal foundations of a local theory of partial truth. This is done by introducing and exploring the concept of truth space. (shrink)